See, this is why I prefer the (terribly named) “Many Worlds” interpretation. Unlike the Copenhagen interpretation, it does not privilege measurement over other types of interactions between systems. That is, the wave function never collapses, it only seems to because you, as the observer, are part of the system.
The easy way to see this is to imagine that you put some other experimenter inside of a box. When they perform a measurement, from your perspective the wave function has not yet collapsed, but from the experimenter’s perspective the wave has collapsed. Essentially, it is as if the system in a box has branched so that there are multiple copies of the experimenter within, one who sees each possible measurement result, but because you are outside of it you could, in theory, reverse the measurement and unite the two branches. However, it is important to understand that the concept of branches is just a visualization; it is nothing inherent to the theory, and when things get even slightly more complicated than the situation I have described, they do not meaningfully exist at all.
(Also, if it seems implausible that a macroscopic system in a box could remain in a superposition of multiple states, you actually are not wrong! However, the reason is not theoretical but practical: any system inside the box will interact thermally with the box itself, so unless it is perfectly insulated you cannot help but interact with it and therefore measure it yourself. This keeps going until essentially the entire world cannot help but perform a measurement of your system. Preventing this tendency from screwing things up is one of the things that makes building quantum computers hard.)
The Many Worlds interpretation is rather unconvincing to me for many reasons.
|1| It claims it is “simpler” just by dropping the Born rule, but it is mathematically impossible to derive the Born rule from the Schrodinger equation alone. You must include some additional assumption to derive it, and so it ends up necessarily having to introduce an additional postulate at some point to derive the Born rule from. Its number of assumptions thus always equal that of any other interpretation but with additional mathematical complexity caused by the derivation.
|2| It claims to be “local” because there is no nonlocal wavefunction collapse. But the EPR paper already proves it’s mathematically impossible for something to match the predictions of quantum theory and be causally local if there are no hidden variables. This is obscured by the fact that MWI proponents like to claim the Born rule probabilities are a subjective illusion and not physically real, but illusions still have a physical cause that need to be physically explained, and any explanation you give must reproduce Born rule probabilities, and thus must violate causal locality. Some MWI proponents try to get around this by redefining locality in terms of relativistic locality, but even Copenhagen is local in that sense, so you end up with no benefits over Copenhagen if you accept that redefinition.
|3| It relies on belief that there exists an additional mathematical entity Ψ as opposed to just ψ, but there exists no mathematical definition or derivation of this entity. Even Everett agreed that all the little ψ we work with in quantum theory are relative states, but then he proposes that there exists an absolute universal Ψ, but to me this makes about as much sense as claiming there exists a universal velocity in Galilean relativity. There is no way to combine relative velocities to give you a universal velocity, they are just fundamentally relative. Similarly, wavefunctions in quantum mechanics are fundamentally relative. A universal wavefunction does not meaningfully exist.
|4| You describe MWI as kind of a copying of the world into different branches where different observers see different outcomes of the experiment, but that is not what MWI actually claims. MWI claims the Born rule is a subjective illusion and all that exists is the Schrodinger equation, but the Schrodinger equation never branches. If, for example, a photon hits a beam splitter with a 50% chance of passing through and a 50% chance of being reflected and you have a detector on either side, the Schrodinger equation will never evolve into a state that looks anything like it having past through or it having been reflected, nor will it ever evolve into a state that looks anything like it having past through and it having been reflected. The state it evolves into is entirely disconnected from the discrete states we actually observe except through the Born rule. Indeed, even those probabilities I gave you come from the Born rule.
This was something Einstein pointed out in relation to atomic decay, that no matter how long you evolve the Schrodinger equation, it never evolves into a state that looks anything like decay vs non-decay. You never get to a state that looks like either or, both, or neither. You end up with something entirely unrecognizable from what we would actually observe in an experiment, only connected back to the probabilities of decay vs non-decay by the Born rule. If the universe really is just the Schrodinger equation, you simply cannot say that it branches into two “worlds” where in one you see one outcome and in another you see a different outcome, because the Schrodinger equation never gives you that. You would have to claim that the entire world consists of a single evolving infinite-dimensional universal wavefunction that is nothing akin to anything we have ever observed before.
There is a good lecture below by Maudlin on this problem, that MWI presents a theory which has no connection to observable reality because nothing within the theory contains any observables.
The gigantic, universal ψ wave that contains all the possible worlds is like Hegel’s dark night in which all cows are black: it does not account, per se, for the phenomenological reality that we actually observe. In order to describe the phenomena that we observe, other mathematical elements are needed besides ψ: the individual variables, like X and P, that we use to describe the world. The Many Worlds interpretation does not explain them clearly. It is not enough to know the ψ wave and Schrödinger’s equation in order to define and use quantum theory: we need to specify an algebra of observables, otherwise we cannot calculate anything and there is no relation with the phenomena of our experience. The role of this algebra of observables, which is extremely clear in other interpretations, is not at all clear in the Many Worlds interpretation.
— Carlo Rovelli, “Helgoland: Making Sense of the Quantum Revolution”
First, working in terms of decoherence is significantly simpler than worrying about whether something has been measured or not at every single step of the evolution of a system, because I have observed that when people do the latter they tend to get headaches contemplating the meaning of the “quantum eraser” when there is no need to. Second, you actually can observe Born’s rule in action by modeling the evolution of a system with an experimenter performing measurements and watching it emerge from the calculation.
The only way that the two sides of the EPR pair know that they agree or disagree is by communicating with each other and comparing results, which can only happen through local interactions.
I have no idea what you even mean by this. What makes the (terribly named) Many Worlds Interpretation nice is precisely that you can just treat everything as a wave function, with parts that might be entangled in ways you don’t know about (i.e., decoherence, modeled via density matrices).
The fact that you are even making this claim is why I have trouble taking the rest of your comment seriously at all, because I specifically said, “However, it is important to understand that the concept of branches is just a visualization; it is nothing inherent to the theory, and when things get even slightly more complicated than the situation I have described, they do not meaningfully exist at all.”
Not sure what this first point means. To describe decoherence you need something like density matrix notation or Liouville notation which is mathematically much more complicated. For example, a qubit’s state vector grows by 2^N, but if you represent it in Liouville notation then the vector grows by 4^N. It is far more mathematically complicated as a description, but I don’t really see why that matters anyways as it’s not like I reject such notation. Your second point also agrees with me. We know the Born rule is real because we can observe real outcomes on measurement devices, something which MWI denies exists and something you will go on to deny in your point #4
This is also true in Copenhagen. Again, if that’s your criterion for locality then Copenhagen is also local.
I think you should read Everett’s papers “‘Relative State’ Formulation of Quantum Mechanics” and “The Theory of the Universal Wave Function” to see the difference between wavefunctions defined in a relative sense vs a universal sense. You will encounter this with any paper on the topic. I’m a bit surprised you genuinely have never heard of the concept of the universal wavefunction yet are defending MWI?
That quotation does not come one iota close to even having the air of giving the impression of loosely responding to what I wrote. You are not seriously engaging with what I wrote at all. You denying the physical existence of real-world discrete outcomes is exactly what I am criticizing, so just quoting yourself denying it is only confirming my point.
A simpler way of stating my point is that entanglement is sufficient to understand measurement, and more importantly, what phenomena are “measurement-like” and which aren’t. Also, you missed my point regarding the Born rule. You can write down a mathematical model of an experimenter repeating an experiment and recording their measurements, turn the crank, and see the probabilities predicted by the Born rule fall out, without any experiment ever having taken place.
I am confused, then, about what we are supposedly even arguing about here. (Are you sure you are even arguing with me, rather than someone else?)
I did some searching and I think that what you are calling “relative states” is an older term for what we now call “entangled states”. Being entangled with another system implies (by definition) that there is a greater system containing you and the other system, and so on, which is how you end up with a universal system that contains everything. However, we do not actually believe that reality is dictated by quantum mechanics but by quantum field theory, which is manifestly built on top of special relativity and posits a single field for each kind of particle for the entire Universe, and describes the microscopic behavior so well that it is absurd. Of course, the next step is figuring out how to reconcile this with general relativity, but that isn’t something Copenhagen helps you out with either.
First you criticize the way that I talked about branches, which I only mentioned briefly as a sort of crude visualization and explicitly called out as being such. Now you are claiming that I am “denying the physical existence of real-world discrete outcomes”?
Entanglement is just a mathematical property of the theory. If it is sufficient to explain measurement then there is not anything particularly unique about MWI since you can employ this explanation within anything. You also say I missed your point by repeating exactly what I said.
You’re the one giving this bullet point list as if you are debunking all of my points one-by-one. If you agree there is nothing especially “more local” about MWI than any other interpretation then why not just ignore that point and move on?
A relative state is not an entangled state. Again you need to read the papers I linked. We are talking about observer-dependence in the sense of how the velocity of a train in Galilean relativity can be said to have a different value simultaneously for two different observers. I drew the direct comparison here in order to explain that in my first comment. This isn’t about special relativity or general relativity, but about “relativity” in a more abstract sense of things which are only meaningfully defined as a relational property between systems. The quantum state observer A assigns to a system can be different from the quantum state observer B assigns to the system (see the Wigner’s friend thought experiment). The quantum state in quantum mechanics is clearly relative in this sense, and to claim there is a universal quantum state requires an additional leap which is never mathematically justified.
Please for the love of god just scroll up and read what I actually wrote in that first post and respond to it. Or don’t. You clearly seem to be entirely uninterested in a serious conversation. I assume you have an emotional attachment to MWI without even having read Everett’s papers and getting too defensive that you refuse to engage seriously in anything I say, so I am ending this conversation here. You don’t even know what a universal wavefunction is despite that being the title of Everett’s paper and are trying to lecture me about this subject without even reading a word I have written, claiming that the opinions of the cited academics here are “not even worth taken seriously.” This is just an enormous level of arrogance that isn’t worth engaging with.
I assume you have an emotional attachment to MWI without even having read Everett’s papers and getting too defensive that you refuse to engage seriously in anything I say, so I am ending this conversation here.
Uhh, okay. Like, you were the one who felt the need to go on the attack here, but if you need to stop for your mental health than so be it. 🙂
Unlike the Copenhagen interpretation, it does not privilege measurement over other types of interactions between systems.
Hmm, you could say it instead privileges the subjective experience over other types of interaction. There’s no reason in principle why you couldn’t experience every “world” at the same time, in the same way a measurement could in principle return all possible results at the same time.
But you don’t. Somehow your experience of reality is above unitary time evolution, even though “you” aren’t.
I agree completely that that the Copenhagen interpretation makes an excellent phenomenological model in simple (albeit, very common!) settings. However, the problem is that it breaks down when you consider experiments such as the “quantum eraser” (mentioned in other comments here), which causes people to tie themselves into intellectual knots because they are thinking too hard about exactly what is going on with measurement; once one deprivileges measurement so that it becomes just another kind of interaction, the seeming paradoxes disappear.
Copenhagen interpretation doesn’t break down for quantum erasure. Upon measurement you collapse the total quantum state into a result where the two measurements are consistent, that’s simply what entanglement means.
The timing of experiments, and the choice of what to measure, are elements ultimately irrelevant to the above statement, as the quantum erasure experiment demonstrates.
To clarify my imprecise language, what “breaks down” is not its ability to give the correct answer, but the ability of the conceptual framework to give a clear explanation of what is going on, because it essentially defines measurement as “you know one when you see one”, which can lead to confusion.
(However, separately, I do feel the need to point out that “entanglement” is not at all a term that is related to measurement results per se, but rather to the state of a system before you measure it. In particular, if a system is entangled, you can (in principle) disentangle it by reversing whatever process you used to entangle it so that you no longer get correlations in the measurements.)
I don’t know, Many Worlds always led to more confusion than Copenhagen for me. But I suppose that’s a matter of taste since they’re equivalent.
As per the relationship between measurement and entanglement, from an empiricist viewpoint all quantum mechanical terms are related to measurement. If entanglement didn’t affect the outcome of measurements, it wouldn’t exist.
Indeed, you can disentangle an entangled system, which of course will change the outcome of measurements - that’s how you know it’s been disentangled.
My main issue with Many Worlds is that it is always superfluous.
We know that the exponential complexity of the quantum state cannot be explained by saying every outcome simply occurs in another branch. That would make it mathematically equivalent to an ensemble, and ensembles can be decomposed into large collections of simple deterministic systems with only linear complexity. If that were how reality worked, quantum mechanics would be unnecessary. The theory could be reduced to classical statistical mechanics.
A quantum superposition, such as an electron being spin up and spin down, is not an electron doing both in some proportions. If it were, it would again be equivalent to an ensemble and fully describable using classical probability theory. If the quantum state has any ontology at all, it cannot merely represent particles doing multiple things at once. It must be something else, a distinct beable that either influences particles, as in pilot wave theories, or gives rise to them, as in collapse models.
Some Many Worlds advocates eventually concede this, but then argue that particles never really existed and are only subjective illusions, while the quantum state alone is real. Calling something a subjective illusion does not remove the need for explanation. Hallucinations are still physical processes with physical causes. You can explain them by analyzing the brain and its interactions.
Likewise, you still need a physical explanation for how the illusion of particles arises. Any such explanation ends up equivalent to explaining how real particles arise, and once you do that, Many Worlds becomes unnecessary. You can always replace the multiverse with a single universe by making the process stochastic instead of deterministic.
The crucial point is that we know a particle in a superposition of states cannot be a particle in multiple states at the same time. That is mathematically impossible and if that is what it was then it could be reduced to a classical description! Any interpretation which relies on thinking the quantum state represents an ensemble, i.e. it represents things “taking all possible paths” or “in multiple states at once,” is just confused as to the mathematics as this is not what the mathematics says.
I think to some extent we have been talking past each other. Very roughly speaking, I think that am more worried about what happens in the middle of an experiment, where you are more worried about what happens at the end. I actually completely agree with you that when a conscious being performs a measurement, then, from the perspective of that being, both interpretations of what happened when it performed the observation are equivalent. That is, the being has no way of telling them apart, and asking which interpretation is true at that point is, in my opinion, roughly along the same lines as asking whether the objective world exists.
(Just to be clear, it’s not my intent to get mystical here. I think of consciousness as essentially just being a way of processing information about the world, rather than positing the existence of souls.)
Interesting framing. But without measurements there isn’t really a need for different interpretations, is there? If that’s what you mean by “in the middle of an experiment”.
I will happily agree that before measurement, it’s very useful to think of the system as existing in many states at the same time.
I’m confused, bc in my armchair reading I’ve thought about why quantum computers try to store information rather than read it from the quantum wave state. Like if everything is connected, if you know about one thing you know about all things. I don’t even know if that makes sense 😂🤷🏻♀️
One of the things that a quantum computer needs to be able to do in order to function is to hold information at rest, no different from your classical computer. There are two things that make this tricky. First, the information is analog, rather than digital. Second, the environment likes to sneakily “measure” your data so that it decoheres and no longer behaves the way it should. Both kinds of problems are in practice dealt with by encoding the quantum information so that errors can be corrected.
If the word “decoheres” sounds really fancy, think about it this way: coherence versus decoherence is the difference between a rainbow and a grey cloud. In the former case the waves are able to interfere with each other in interesting ways, whereas in the latter case they scatter and do not interfere, producing boring results.
See, this is why I prefer the (terribly named) “Many Worlds” interpretation. Unlike the Copenhagen interpretation, it does not privilege measurement over other types of interactions between systems. That is, the wave function never collapses, it only seems to because you, as the observer, are part of the system.
The easy way to see this is to imagine that you put some other experimenter inside of a box. When they perform a measurement, from your perspective the wave function has not yet collapsed, but from the experimenter’s perspective the wave has collapsed. Essentially, it is as if the system in a box has branched so that there are multiple copies of the experimenter within, one who sees each possible measurement result, but because you are outside of it you could, in theory, reverse the measurement and unite the two branches. However, it is important to understand that the concept of branches is just a visualization; it is nothing inherent to the theory, and when things get even slightly more complicated than the situation I have described, they do not meaningfully exist at all.
(Also, if it seems implausible that a macroscopic system in a box could remain in a superposition of multiple states, you actually are not wrong! However, the reason is not theoretical but practical: any system inside the box will interact thermally with the box itself, so unless it is perfectly insulated you cannot help but interact with it and therefore measure it yourself. This keeps going until essentially the entire world cannot help but perform a measurement of your system. Preventing this tendency from screwing things up is one of the things that makes building quantum computers hard.)
The Many Worlds interpretation is rather unconvincing to me for many reasons.
|1| It claims it is “simpler” just by dropping the Born rule, but it is mathematically impossible to derive the Born rule from the Schrodinger equation alone. You must include some additional assumption to derive it, and so it ends up necessarily having to introduce an additional postulate at some point to derive the Born rule from. Its number of assumptions thus always equal that of any other interpretation but with additional mathematical complexity caused by the derivation.
|2| It claims to be “local” because there is no nonlocal wavefunction collapse. But the EPR paper already proves it’s mathematically impossible for something to match the predictions of quantum theory and be causally local if there are no hidden variables. This is obscured by the fact that MWI proponents like to claim the Born rule probabilities are a subjective illusion and not physically real, but illusions still have a physical cause that need to be physically explained, and any explanation you give must reproduce Born rule probabilities, and thus must violate causal locality. Some MWI proponents try to get around this by redefining locality in terms of relativistic locality, but even Copenhagen is local in that sense, so you end up with no benefits over Copenhagen if you accept that redefinition.
|3| It relies on belief that there exists an additional mathematical entity Ψ as opposed to just ψ, but there exists no mathematical definition or derivation of this entity. Even Everett agreed that all the little ψ we work with in quantum theory are relative states, but then he proposes that there exists an absolute universal Ψ, but to me this makes about as much sense as claiming there exists a universal velocity in Galilean relativity. There is no way to combine relative velocities to give you a universal velocity, they are just fundamentally relative. Similarly, wavefunctions in quantum mechanics are fundamentally relative. A universal wavefunction does not meaningfully exist.
|4| You describe MWI as kind of a copying of the world into different branches where different observers see different outcomes of the experiment, but that is not what MWI actually claims. MWI claims the Born rule is a subjective illusion and all that exists is the Schrodinger equation, but the Schrodinger equation never branches. If, for example, a photon hits a beam splitter with a 50% chance of passing through and a 50% chance of being reflected and you have a detector on either side, the Schrodinger equation will never evolve into a state that looks anything like it having past through or it having been reflected, nor will it ever evolve into a state that looks anything like it having past through and it having been reflected. The state it evolves into is entirely disconnected from the discrete states we actually observe except through the Born rule. Indeed, even those probabilities I gave you come from the Born rule.
This was something Einstein pointed out in relation to atomic decay, that no matter how long you evolve the Schrodinger equation, it never evolves into a state that looks anything like decay vs non-decay. You never get to a state that looks like either or, both, or neither. You end up with something entirely unrecognizable from what we would actually observe in an experiment, only connected back to the probabilities of decay vs non-decay by the Born rule. If the universe really is just the Schrodinger equation, you simply cannot say that it branches into two “worlds” where in one you see one outcome and in another you see a different outcome, because the Schrodinger equation never gives you that. You would have to claim that the entire world consists of a single evolving infinite-dimensional universal wavefunction that is nothing akin to anything we have ever observed before.
There is a good lecture below by Maudlin on this problem, that MWI presents a theory which has no connection to observable reality because nothing within the theory contains any observables.
Rovelli also comments on it:
First, working in terms of decoherence is significantly simpler than worrying about whether something has been measured or not at every single step of the evolution of a system, because I have observed that when people do the latter they tend to get headaches contemplating the meaning of the “quantum eraser” when there is no need to. Second, you actually can observe Born’s rule in action by modeling the evolution of a system with an experimenter performing measurements and watching it emerge from the calculation.
The only way that the two sides of the EPR pair know that they agree or disagree is by communicating with each other and comparing results, which can only happen through local interactions.
I have no idea what you even mean by this. What makes the (terribly named) Many Worlds Interpretation nice is precisely that you can just treat everything as a wave function, with parts that might be entangled in ways you don’t know about (i.e., decoherence, modeled via density matrices).
The fact that you are even making this claim is why I have trouble taking the rest of your comment seriously at all, because I specifically said, “However, it is important to understand that the concept of branches is just a visualization; it is nothing inherent to the theory, and when things get even slightly more complicated than the situation I have described, they do not meaningfully exist at all.”
A simpler way of stating my point is that entanglement is sufficient to understand measurement, and more importantly, what phenomena are “measurement-like” and which aren’t. Also, you missed my point regarding the Born rule. You can write down a mathematical model of an experimenter repeating an experiment and recording their measurements, turn the crank, and see the probabilities predicted by the Born rule fall out, without any experiment ever having taken place.
I am confused, then, about what we are supposedly even arguing about here. (Are you sure you are even arguing with me, rather than someone else?)
I did some searching and I think that what you are calling “relative states” is an older term for what we now call “entangled states”. Being entangled with another system implies (by definition) that there is a greater system containing you and the other system, and so on, which is how you end up with a universal system that contains everything. However, we do not actually believe that reality is dictated by quantum mechanics but by quantum field theory, which is manifestly built on top of special relativity and posits a single field for each kind of particle for the entire Universe, and describes the microscopic behavior so well that it is absurd. Of course, the next step is figuring out how to reconcile this with general relativity, but that isn’t something Copenhagen helps you out with either.
First you criticize the way that I talked about branches, which I only mentioned briefly as a sort of crude visualization and explicitly called out as being such. Now you are claiming that I am “denying the physical existence of real-world discrete outcomes”?
Uhh, okay. Like, you were the one who felt the need to go on the attack here, but if you need to stop for your mental health than so be it. 🙂
Hmm, you could say it instead privileges the subjective experience over other types of interaction. There’s no reason in principle why you couldn’t experience every “world” at the same time, in the same way a measurement could in principle return all possible results at the same time.
But you don’t. Somehow your experience of reality is above unitary time evolution, even though “you” aren’t.
I agree completely that that the Copenhagen interpretation makes an excellent phenomenological model in simple (albeit, very common!) settings. However, the problem is that it breaks down when you consider experiments such as the “quantum eraser” (mentioned in other comments here), which causes people to tie themselves into intellectual knots because they are thinking too hard about exactly what is going on with measurement; once one deprivileges measurement so that it becomes just another kind of interaction, the seeming paradoxes disappear.
Copenhagen interpretation doesn’t break down for quantum erasure. Upon measurement you collapse the total quantum state into a result where the two measurements are consistent, that’s simply what entanglement means.
The timing of experiments, and the choice of what to measure, are elements ultimately irrelevant to the above statement, as the quantum erasure experiment demonstrates.
To clarify my imprecise language, what “breaks down” is not its ability to give the correct answer, but the ability of the conceptual framework to give a clear explanation of what is going on, because it essentially defines measurement as “you know one when you see one”, which can lead to confusion.
(However, separately, I do feel the need to point out that “entanglement” is not at all a term that is related to measurement results per se, but rather to the state of a system before you measure it. In particular, if a system is entangled, you can (in principle) disentangle it by reversing whatever process you used to entangle it so that you no longer get correlations in the measurements.)
I don’t know, Many Worlds always led to more confusion than Copenhagen for me. But I suppose that’s a matter of taste since they’re equivalent.
As per the relationship between measurement and entanglement, from an empiricist viewpoint all quantum mechanical terms are related to measurement. If entanglement didn’t affect the outcome of measurements, it wouldn’t exist.
Indeed, you can disentangle an entangled system, which of course will change the outcome of measurements - that’s how you know it’s been disentangled.
My main issue with Many Worlds is that it is always superfluous.
We know that the exponential complexity of the quantum state cannot be explained by saying every outcome simply occurs in another branch. That would make it mathematically equivalent to an ensemble, and ensembles can be decomposed into large collections of simple deterministic systems with only linear complexity. If that were how reality worked, quantum mechanics would be unnecessary. The theory could be reduced to classical statistical mechanics.
A quantum superposition, such as an electron being spin up and spin down, is not an electron doing both in some proportions. If it were, it would again be equivalent to an ensemble and fully describable using classical probability theory. If the quantum state has any ontology at all, it cannot merely represent particles doing multiple things at once. It must be something else, a distinct beable that either influences particles, as in pilot wave theories, or gives rise to them, as in collapse models.
Some Many Worlds advocates eventually concede this, but then argue that particles never really existed and are only subjective illusions, while the quantum state alone is real. Calling something a subjective illusion does not remove the need for explanation. Hallucinations are still physical processes with physical causes. You can explain them by analyzing the brain and its interactions.
Likewise, you still need a physical explanation for how the illusion of particles arises. Any such explanation ends up equivalent to explaining how real particles arise, and once you do that, Many Worlds becomes unnecessary. You can always replace the multiverse with a single universe by making the process stochastic instead of deterministic.
The crucial point is that we know a particle in a superposition of states cannot be a particle in multiple states at the same time. That is mathematically impossible and if that is what it was then it could be reduced to a classical description! Any interpretation which relies on thinking the quantum state represents an ensemble, i.e. it represents things “taking all possible paths” or “in multiple states at once,” is just confused as to the mathematics as this is not what the mathematics says.
I go into this in more detail here: https://medium.com/p/f67aacb622d5
I think to some extent we have been talking past each other. Very roughly speaking, I think that am more worried about what happens in the middle of an experiment, where you are more worried about what happens at the end. I actually completely agree with you that when a conscious being performs a measurement, then, from the perspective of that being, both interpretations of what happened when it performed the observation are equivalent. That is, the being has no way of telling them apart, and asking which interpretation is true at that point is, in my opinion, roughly along the same lines as asking whether the objective world exists.
(Just to be clear, it’s not my intent to get mystical here. I think of consciousness as essentially just being a way of processing information about the world, rather than positing the existence of souls.)
Interesting framing. But without measurements there isn’t really a need for different interpretations, is there? If that’s what you mean by “in the middle of an experiment”.
I will happily agree that before measurement, it’s very useful to think of the system as existing in many states at the same time.
I’m confused, bc in my armchair reading I’ve thought about why quantum computers try to store information rather than read it from the quantum wave state. Like if everything is connected, if you know about one thing you know about all things. I don’t even know if that makes sense 😂🤷🏻♀️
One of the things that a quantum computer needs to be able to do in order to function is to hold information at rest, no different from your classical computer. There are two things that make this tricky. First, the information is analog, rather than digital. Second, the environment likes to sneakily “measure” your data so that it decoheres and no longer behaves the way it should. Both kinds of problems are in practice dealt with by encoding the quantum information so that errors can be corrected.
If the word “decoheres” sounds really fancy, think about it this way: coherence versus decoherence is the difference between a rainbow and a grey cloud. In the former case the waves are able to interfere with each other in interesting ways, whereas in the latter case they scatter and do not interfere, producing boring results.
That’s awesome, I hope I’m understanding it enough to think it’s awesome anyways 😂 Thanks for writing that out 💜