These days, everyone in Washington is talking about U.S. missile stockpiles. The previously niche topic has been thrust onto the front page of major newspapers and is discussed daily on television and radio programming.

And for good reason. After the war in Iran severely depleted U.S. missile reserves, including its most sophisticated air defense and offensive weapons, there are growing questions about the ability of the U.S. military to do what is required to defend U.S. interests, especially in the near-term.

The news gets much worse, however. Not only did the first 40 days of conflict with Iran exacerbate shortages of expensive and exquisite U.S. munitions; they have also shown that the United States is not ready for a major power war.

Though the U.S. military was able to achieve individual tactical successes in Iran, the conflict and its outcome have sharply undercut key principles of U.S. military strategy and raised doubts about the viability of U.S. contingency plans, in particular for a future war in Asia. Moving forward, the United States will need to recalibrate its commitments to better match the realities of modern warfare and the growing limits on U.S. military power.

A war against Iran and one in Asia (over Taiwan for instance) would look different in many ways, especially given that the former is offensive and the latter would most likely be defensive. But there are several notable similarities. First, as in the Middle East, in Asia, the United States would rely heavily on forward bases across the region to launch aircraft and house logistics and combat support capabilities. It would depend on ground-based air defense and a network of radars and sensors to protect those bases and to inform U.S. missile targeting.

Second, in Asia as in Iran, the U.S. military would exploit fighter jets, bombers, and warships using stand-off weapons alongside ground-based missiles to fire at adversary air defenses, radars, and missile launchers. It would also target hostile aircraft and naval vessels including those supporting an amphibious invasion or those setting up a blockade.

Third, in the case of a war over Taiwan, the United States plans to use drones to create a “hellscape” for Chinese forces, preventing their ability to advance through the sea, air, or on the ground. Drones also featured heavily in Iran, with the U.S. military debuting new systems.

The Iran war, fought with a weaker adversary, challenges each of these foundational pillars of the U.S. military strategy for future major power wars, whether against China or otherwise.

Perhaps most importantly, the Iran war casts serious doubt on the utility and viability of U.S. forward bases in a major conflict. After the United States attacked Iran on February 28, U.S. bases across the region were not sources of strength but massive liabilities and easy targets. From the war’s first days, U.S. bases suffered heavy drone and missile attacks and were even reportedly bombed by Iranian fighter jets.

The damage suffered by U.S. bases across the Middle East was staggering. Infrastructure, air defense systems, and ground-based sensors and radars were destroyed. Pricey U.S. aircraft, including refuelers and AWACS early warning jets, were damaged. In fact, bases across the Middle East were so susceptible to adversary attack that U.S. military personnel could no longer operate out of them and were instead forced to work from nearby locations and hotels.

If bases in the Middle East are not defensible, the Pentagon cannot assume that those spread across the Pacific will be either. In fact, many or most may be largely un-usable, especially in the crucial early days of any war.

Another key result in the Middle East that should set off alarm bells across the Pentagon’s senior leadership is Iran’s ability to damage and degrade the sensors and radars that support the U.S. regional air defense network, a military success for Iran that left U.S. bases exposed.

The United States has long relied on ground-based air defense systems to protect U.S. personnel, infrastructure, and assets from adversary missiles. But Iran was able to effectively disable these systems, suggesting that this approach to force protection is entirely insufficient in a world of “precise mass” where even weak adversaries have advanced targeting capabilities. If the U.S. ground-based air defense network could not survive against Iran, it is most certainly inadequate for a war with China.

The U.S. experience against Iran also raises questions about U.S. plans to rely primarily on stand-off weapons to strike Chinese ships and military targets in an Indo-Pacific contingency. Although this strategy evolved as a response to China’s anti-access/air denial capabilities, which will make operating close to the mainland coast impossible, the war in Iran suggests that the stand-off approach may be limited in what it can accomplish.

Although the U.S. military was effective in destroying much of Iran’s air defenses, reports suggest that it was only able to eliminate perhaps 50 percent of the country’s missiles and missile launchers and an even smaller portion of its drone production. Indeed, although Iran’s rate of fire collapsed significantly after the first few days of the war, the United States was never able to fully suppress Iran’s missile fire or stop it from launching drones at U.S. and Gulf state targets. U.S. forces are likely to fare much worse in a campaign to disable China’s missile and drone capabilities, given China’s more advanced air defense and deeper missile arsenal.

Moreover, in this type of contested environment, goals like air superiority and sea control are largely out of reach even for the United States. Although the U.S. military did eventually achieve a degree of air dominance over Iran, this did not eliminate risk to U.S. aircraft. The constraints on U.S. naval power were even more extensive. Not only were U.S. warships forced to operate at a distance from Iranian coasts because of missile and drone threats, but the ability of the U.S. Navy to control the waters off Iran’s coast was limited. The U.S. blockade let through at least as many Iranian ships as it diverted.

In a war in Asia, U.S. warships would face even greater challenges. In a worst case scenario, aircraft carriers and destroyers could be forced to operate beyond the second island chain, reducing their value in a defense of Taiwan or an effort to blockade Chinese ports.

Finally, there is the issue of drones. Iran had the clear advantage here, both in the air and undersea. The United States is far from being competitive in the drone space, let alone ready to create a hellscape for China, one of the industry’s leaders.

The bottom line is that the Iran war has cast a spotlight on the flaws and weaknesses in U.S. military strategy, both in general and specifically as it pertains to contingencies in Asia. The United States has for decades assumed that its forward bases will be defensible and that power projection assets such as bombers, aircraft carriers, and fighter jets will allow the United States to prevail in military contests even far from home.

It has assumed that it can dominate the air and the seas and protect assets on the ground, even close to adversary terrain.

If these things were ever true, they are not anymore. Money and time can fix munitions shortages in the medium term, but they cannot solve these more serious and, in many ways, intractable strategic shortcomings. In an increasingly multipolar world where access to military power has been democratized and the United States has a smaller advantage than in the past, what the United States can achieve with military force will be more limited. U.S. strategic aims and ambitions will need to adjust accordingly.

The EU is weighing sanctions on Israeli-linked entities over the alleged theft of Ukrainian grain shipments, as Kiev accuses Israeli authorities of allowing the “stolen” cargo to enter through Haifa port, Haaretz reported on 27 April.

EU foreign affairs spokesperson Anouar el-Anouni said the bloc is reviewing reports that a Russian “shadow fleet” vessel carrying Ukrainian grain harvested from occupied territories was allowed to unload in Israel.

He added that Brussels “condemns any actions that contribute to financing Russia’s illegal war effort” and warned that individuals and entities in third countries could face sanctions if they help circumvent restrictions.

The warning follows a diplomatic escalation triggered by the arrival of vessels at Haifa port carrying large amounts of grain reportedly taken from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, including the vessel Panormitis, which carried 25,000 tons of grain.

Ukrainian officials say at least four similar shipments have already been offloaded this year, raising concerns about systematic facilitation by Israeli authorities.

Kiev has formally protested the shipments, with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha summoning Israel’s ambassador and warning that continued inaction risks damaging bilateral ties.

Ukraine’s embassy described the deliveries as a potential “blatant violation of international law and Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty.”

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky condemned the trade, saying the purchase of such grain “cannot be legitimate business, “ accusing Russia of “systematically seizing grain on temporarily occupied Ukrainian land” and exporting it through networks linked to occupying authorities.

The dispute has drawn in European policymakers, with a joint démarche issued alongside Ukraine demanding clarification from Israeli authorities.

The EU signaled it is ready to increase pressure beyond Russia and target external actors accused of enabling the trade, with an EU spokesperson saying “individuals and entities in third countries” are not immune from sanctions if they bypass restrictions.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar dismissed the accusations as “media diplomacy,” saying Kiev had provided no concrete evidence to support claims the grain was stolen, while Ukraine maintains that all grain produced in territories occupied by Russia since 2014 and 2022 is considered stolen.